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AM I MY SON?  HUMAN CLONES AND THE MODERN FAMILY 
 
W. Nicholson Price II1 
 
As increasingly complex assisted reproductive technologies (ART) 
become available, legal and social conceptions of family become 
ambiguous and sometimes misaligned.  The as-yet unrealized technology 
of cloning provides the clearest example of this confusion:  is the legal 
parent of a clone the individual cloned, or are that individual’s parents also 
the parents of the clone?  These issues have been generally obscured by 
the debates around the deployment of ART, especially cloning; far less 
consideration has been given to the way these new technologies impact the 
way we think about and develop law on the relationships between genetic, 
social, gestational, and legal parenthood.  This article considers these 
issues in depth, looking at competing common-law frameworks for 
determining parentage, the statutory framework of parentage, and deeper 
theoretical concerns underlying the area.  The article concludes that an 
intent-based framework, with at least some external limitations, most 
accurately matches law to social views of parents using new forms of 
ART. 
                                                           
1 JD/PhD Candidate (Biology), Columbia University 2011.  The author wishes to thank Ana 
Bračič for advice and support, and Profs. Katherine Franke, Ariela Dubler, and Patricia Williams 
for helpful comments. 





Two sympathetic stories are frequently told in debates about human reproductive 
cloning.2  In the first, a young child dies in a tragic accident, but some of the child’s cells 
remain viable, and the parents want to clone their beloved child.3  In the second, a doubly 
infertile couple—a woman unable to produce viable ova and a man unable to produce 
viable sperm—wish desperately for a child genetically related to at least one of them, and 
therefore clone one member of the couple.4  These stories normally serve to illustrate the 
poignant situations which might justify human reproductive cloning, but they illustrate 
another point equally well:  in the context of human cloning, our intuitions can vary 
widely about how we see the cloned child fitting into the world around it.  In the first 
situation, we intuit clearly that the parents of the prematurely deceased child should also 
be considered the parents of the clone—call him Rob (for “Replacing Our Boy”).  In the 
second situation, we intuit just as clearly that the clone—call him Junior—should be 
considered the child of the infertile couple, one of whom provided the genetic material 
                                                           
2 A note on terminology:  the term “clone” can refer to entities at many states in the 
development process.  For the purposes of this paper, “human clone” will refer only to post-birth 
children cloned from an adult somatic cell via somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT).  Further 
details on the cloning process will follow, but it should be clear from the start that “clones,” here, 
refer to human beings after birth, and not to early or late stage embryos or fetuses; it also refers 
only to SCNT clones, not embryo-splitting clones or natural clones—i.e., identical twins. 
3 M Fainzilber, Advantage of Knowing Nature's Secrets, 386  Nature 431 (1997). 
4 CBS News, Cloning For Infertile Couples?, Cloning A Way For Infertile Couples To Have 
Their Own Family , http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/1998/07/22/tech/main14458.shtml (July 22, 
1998). 
Family Tree of Paradigm Clones: 
Following traditional formatting, 
males are shown as squares and 
females as circles; solid lines show 
descent by sexual reproduction.  
Individuals are patterned according 
to their genetics.  Cloning is 
indicated by a thick dotted line.  The 
social parents and grandparents are 
the same for Rob and Junior, but the 
genetic relationships (defined as the 
origin of sets of chromosomes) 
between those individuals are 
different.  
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for the cloning.5 
Socially, these attributions make intuitive sense.  Biologically, they are 
incompatible definitions, because the child has a different genetic relationship to the 
socially intuitive parents in each case.6  The family tree shown below demonstrates this 
point.  Rob effectively gets his two sets of chromosomes from the parents of the child 
being replaced, albeit through a physical intermediary.  Junior, on the other hand, gets all 
of his DNA from one member of the infertile couple (Senior).  Since he has the same 
genetic makeup as Senior, he also gets the two halves of his genetic information from 
Senior’s parents—that is, the people we would intuitively consider Junior’s grandparents.  
Therefore, his social grandparents fill the typical genetic role of parents.  Even though the 
social family tree is the same for Rob and Junior, with social grandparents, parents, and a 
clone child, Rob and Junior occupy different places in the genetic family tree.  It is this 
dichotomy that makes clones particularly well suited to tease apart the interactions 
between social and biological parentage. 
Legally, the meaning of “parent” is a muddled mixture of biological and social 
factors.7  Recent developments in assisted reproductive technology have begun to 
challenge social and legal notions of parentage.  The unique circumstances of human 
clones shed further light on these challenges in two ways.  First, and most 
straightforwardly, the poor fit of clones into current explicit family law definitions reveal 
the relative rigidity of even modern and supposedly comprehensive frameworks.  Second, 
and perhaps more fundamentally, the boundary case of clones can help illuminate more 
central concepts of family.  Specifically, clones demonstrate the insufficiency of 
disaggregating parentage into social and biological aspects, or even further 
disaggregating biological parentage into gestational and genetic, since “genetic parent” is 
itself an ambiguous idea.  Science-based atomization of parental concepts is unlikely to 
yield definitive rules for courts and society, especially when the science involved is 
constantly changing.  When faced with hard social questions in areas of changing 
science, the law should look to that science for input, not answers. 
                                                           
5 I am aware of the unfortunate circumstance that a felicitous acronym and the Anglo-
American limitation of name-sharing to males combine to make both example cases 
unrepresentatively male.  I apologize for this, but hope that increased ease of reading outweighs 
the unintentional demographic slight. 
6 In this introductory analysis, I use genetic parents to mean those two individuals who 
contribute exactly half of the genetic information to the genetic child.  Therefore, the donor is not 
a genetic parent because he contributes all of his genetic information.  Other potentially 
reasonable definitions of genetic parents exist and are considered in detail in section III.C.1. 
7 For other analyses of the modern interactions between social and biological factors in family 
contexts, see generally Janet L. Dolgin, Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family, 41 
Akron Law Review 347 (2008); Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal 
Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50  Buffalo Law Review 
341 (2002); M. B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 38  
Arizona State Law Journal 809 (2006); MB Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional 
Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 Journal of Law and Family 
Studies 309, 309-339(2007). 
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Surrounding any discussion of human cloning and the law is a vigorous debate on 
the morality of allowing any human reproductive cloning at all. 8  Commentators have 
written on the reproductive choice benefits of allowing human cloning,9 the benefits to 
society of replicating the genomes of great individuals,10 and the necessity of ensuring 
fair treatment of practically close-to-inevitable clones.11  Likewise, much has been 
written about the practical and potentially unacceptable medical difficulties of human 
cloning,12 the challenges to personhood of having the genome associated with an already-
lived life,13 and concerns about objectifying children.14  This paper will not venture into 
the realm of morality, which has been and is being well canvassed by others.  Rather, it 
will focus exclusively on the practical and theoretical ways that clones interact with and 
change our understanding of the bases of the parent-child relationship. 
This Article proceeds in five Parts.  Part I addresses the background rhetoric 
around this issue, considering the foundational physical and informational ideas that 
underlie these conceptions of family relationships and how the features of human clones 
can disaggregate and complicate them.  In Part II, I discuss practical details which shape 
both the theoretical and real-world implications of human clones:  the specifics of cloning 
science, the status of human cloning, and existing laws and guidelines about cloning.  
Part III examines the interactions of human clones with the common law of determining 
complex parentage, particularly the pure-genetics rule and the procreative-intent test.  
Part IV steps back to look more generally at the comprehensive statutory framework for 
parentage law, the Uniform Parentage Act, and the way human clones illuminate 
problems in its view of parentage.  Part V examines further implications of the current 
situation and recommendations for improving it. 
                                                           
8 See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, Human Cloning and Human Dignity: The Report of the President's 
Council On Bioethics (2002); Leon R. Kass & James Q. Wilson, The Ethics of Human Cloning 
(1998); L. R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the Cloning of Humans, 32 
Val. U.L. Rev. 679, PINCITE (1997); Ronald Cole-Turner, Human Cloning: Religious Responses 
(1997); William Dudley, The Ethics of Human Cloning; Glenn McGee, The Human Cloning 
Debate (2002); Gregory E. Pence, Flesh of My Flesh: The Ethics of Cloning Humans: a Reader 
(1998); M. C. Brannigan, Ethical Issues in Human Cloning (2001). 
9 John Harris, “Goodbye Dolly?” The Ethics of Human Cloning, 23 J Med Ethics 353 
(1997). 
10 Joshua Lederberg, Experimental Genetics and Human Evolution, 100 Am. Naturalist 519, 
519-31 (1966). 
11 Kass, supra note 8. 
12 Kass, supra note 8, at 99-101; S. M. Rhind et al., Human Cloning: Can It Be Made Safe?, 4 
Nature Reviews Genetics 855, 855-864 (2003). 
13 Dan W. Brock, Human Cloning and Our Sense of Self, 296 Sci. 314, 314-16 (2002); Kass, 
supra note 8, at 114-116. 
14 Kass, supra note 8, at 116-120. 
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I. BACKGROUND RHETORIC: “BLOOD RELATIVES” AND “FLESH AND BLOOD” RELATIONSHIPS. 
The language of human relationships, both conversational and legal, reflects the 
overlap and aggregations between social and biological concepts.  Among the oldest 
descriptions of biological relationships are the ideas of “blood relatives” and “flesh and 
blood” relationships.15  Both terms are rooted in the biology of engendering children, and 
both are still used by courts to describe biological bases for family relationships.  
Recently, though, their meanings have begun to diverge, reflecting the technological and 
scientific disaggregation of social, gestational, and genetic parenthood.  These differing 
meanings, challenging to parse independently, become much more clearly separable in 
the context of human clones.   
Blood relatives are conceived as individuals sharing some measure of blood, as 
opposed to relatives-in-law, who do not share blood from a common ancestor.  Black's 
Law Dictionary states that “[a] person may be said to be ‘of the blood’ of another who 
has any, however small a portion, of the blood derived from a common ancestor.”16  
“Historically and at common law, blood relation was the primary means of establishing 
the legal status of a natural parent.”17   
The idea of shared blood in blood relations has been largely subsumed by the 
modern notion of genetics:  “[u]nder today's laws of parentage, a genetic relationship and 
blood relationship of the correct degree describe and result in the same legal status or 
relationship, and proof of either is still the primary means of establishing parentage.”18  
Support for the contention that genetic relationship is the modern equivalent of the term 
“blood relationship” can be found in the evidentiary practice in disputed parentage cases 
of comparing common biological characteristics. The practice involves the trier of fact's 
comparing genetic traits of the child and the alleged parent, such as facial features, build, 
and color of hair and eyes, to confirm or rebut a blood relationship.”19  In a sense, “blood 
relatives” have become about information, not physicality—they rely on the continuity of 
genetic information and traits.  DNA tests for paternity or maternity are similarly based 
on having the same informational content, and the same alleles of genes.20  The earlier 
                                                           
15 “Flesh,” “blood,” and “flesh and blood” are terms with a rich literature of scholarship in 
many fields outside of law, and even in subfields of law.  Those discourses, however, are outside 
the scope of this work.  For at least one modern view on this topic, see Roy Porter & Simon 
Schama, Flesh in the Age of Reason 573 (2004). 
16 Black's Law Dictionary 218 (4th ed. 1968) (citing Miller v. Grimes, 262 Pa. 226, 226 
(1918)). 
17 Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Ohio Ct. Pleas 1994), citing 1 Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England (7 Ed. 1775), Chapter XVI, Of Parent and Child. 
18 Id. at 763. 
19 Id. at 763, citing Domigan v. Gillette, 479 N.E..2d 291 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). 
20 UPA §§ 102(15), 505; see also Sergio D. J. Pena & Ranajilt Chakraborty, Paternity Testing 
in the DNA Era, 10 Trends Genet.204,  204-09 (1994). 
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notion of physical descent—here, specifically of physically descended DNA molecules—
has been sharply diminished.   
The concept of “flesh and blood,” however, still is grounded in the notion of the 
physical. The most immediate evidence of this comes in the term itself—if blood can be 
about or symbolic of information, flesh is almost universally used to represent physical 
reality.  Its perhaps most obvious genesis is in fact in the Book of Genesis:  “[t]his is now 
bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh:   she shall be called Woman, because she was 
taken out of Man.”21 The use of “flesh and blood” to mean physical people or 
relationships has been incorporated into the language of law.  In non-family contexts, 
courts refer to “flesh and blood” individuals as opposed to legal or corporate entities,22 as 
the requisite victims of injury,23 or as living objects of the law;24 “flesh and blood” 
literally relies on the corporeality of an individual.  In family contexts, “flesh and blood” 
                                                           
21 Genesis 2:23 (King James Version) (emphasis added). 
22 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse LLP v. First Am. Corp., 182 F.R.D. 56, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998)(stating that Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 was designed to prevent inconvenience to “flesh-and-blood 
human beings who are asked to testify, not the legal entity for whom those human beings work.”); 
Adams v. City of Boston, No. 07-10698, 2008 WL 4186275, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2008) (“[A]n 
abstract entity like a municipality may present a much less compelling face to a jury than a flesh 
and blood defendant.”); In re Parker, 395 B.R. 12 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2008) (“[A]t least one of 
the post-petition co-tenants will not even be flesh and blood, but rather an incorporeal fiction of 
the law.”); City of Auburn v. Hedlund, 155 P.3d 149, 152 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2007) (“The statute 
plainly recognizes that DUI and reckless driving may potentially involve flesh and blood victims 
beyond the State in the abstract and the public at large.”).  A judicially rejected version of this 
distinction has cropped up in criminal defense cases, with defendants arguing unsuccessfully that  
 
John Joseph Smith, is a natural, flesh and blood, person, created 
by God.  JOHN JOSEPH SMITH, is a U.S. corporate artificial 
person, U.S. citizen, created by the government.  In basic 
English grammar, a name spelled in upper and lower case, such 
as John Joseph Smith, is indicative of a flesh and blood man, a 
natural person . . . .  On the other hand, a name spelled in all 
caps, such as JOHN JOSEPH SMITH, is indicative of an 
artificial person. 
 See United States v. Mitchell, 405 F.Supp.2d 602, 603-04 n.4 (D. Md. 2005) (quoting 
http://www.usa-the-republic.com/ revenue/true_ history/AffTruth.html (visited December 16, 
2005)) (date visited in original opinion). 
23 Richardson v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 716 N.E.2d 117, 121 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) ( 
“Bodily injury [in the context of an insurance claim] imports harm arising from corporeal contact.  
In this connection ‘bodily’ refers to an organism of flesh and blood.  It is not satisfied by anything 
short of physical, and is confined to that kind of injury . . . .”) (quoting Williams v. Nelson, 117 
N.E. 189, 194 (Mass. 1917)). 
24 See, e.g., United States v. Copeland, 369 F.Supp.2d 275, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that 
immigration laws directly impact “human beings, flesh and blood, men, women and children”). 
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arises most frequently in adoption law, where it functions as a label for physically 
engendered descendants—that is, children physically born of a woman from the physical 
union of a man’s sperm and the woman’s egg.25  While “blood” may have become about 
information, “flesh” has remained about biological-physical connections.26 
This relatively subtle and theoretical difference becomes strikingly unsubtle and 
real in the context of human clones, where the different conceptions of descent yield 
different assignments of parentage.  In Rob’s case, the parents of the original child are his 
genetic or “blood” parents as well—each provided half of the clone’s genetic material, 
just as parents do in a traditional conception.  They are not, however, the direct providers 
of biological physical substance which “flesh and blood” envisages—that role is filled 
instead by the donor of the egg and the deceased child, who provided the physical genetic 
material, from which the clone is made, and potentially by the gestational mother.  For 
Junior, on the other hand, the cloned member of the couple, as the genetic donor, will 
actually be a “flesh and blood” parent—just not a “blood parent,” or genetic parent, since 
the “blood parents” are Junior’s “flesh and blood” paternal grandparents.  By embodying 
this sort of contradiction, clones help to tease apart and clarify the diverging meanings of 
old, basic terms about family relationships.   
Similarly, a close look at clones can help us see more clearly the subtleties and 
challenges of the modern language we use to describe families.  Clones are exemplars 
showing that even the recent disaggregation of biological parentage into genetic and 
gestational shows insufficient nuance.  For clones to play this illustrative role, however, 
we require a more detailed understanding of cloning itself. 
II. THE SCIENCE, CURRENT STATUS, AND LAW OF HUMAN CLONING 
A careful look at the facts of cloning serves three main purposes.  First, the 
history of cloning efforts in animals and humans shows how the technology has 
developed despite substantial scientific and social challenges.  Second, some 
understanding of the details of cloning itself is necessary to correct common 
misconceptions about the differences between clones and donors.  These differences have 
implications for the way clones are treated in a family context, and the way their genetic 
relationships illuminate the problems inherent in biologically-based family definitions.  
Third and finally, the history, science, and regulation of cloning, when taken together, 
lead to the conclusion that human cloning is quite likely in the foreseeable future, and 
that these issues therefore have practical as well as theoretical importance. 
                                                           
25 See, e.g., State ex rel. Russell v. West, 115 S.W.3d 886, 892 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) 
(Goddard, HM, concurring) (stating reluctance because after genetic testing ruled out ex-husband 
as father of child, current husband was willing to let ex-husband support his “own flesh and 
blood”).  
26 Contra Dolgin, supra note 7, at 356 (describing the substitution of genetic information for 
both “blood” and “flesh and blood”). 
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A. The Basic Science of Cloning and Its Use in Animals 
Cloning, also known formally as Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT) happens 
when the nucleus is removed from an unfertilized egg, and replaced with the nucleus 
from a somatic cell—that is, any cell other than a sperm or egg.27  The fusion of these 
two is a zygote that contains all 23 pairs of chromosomes—all the genetic material 
necessary for a biologically normal individual.28  The zygote can then be induced to 
divide with the addition of an electrical current or an ionic solution.29  This results in an 
embryo that carries the same nuclear genetic complement—the 23 chromosome pairs that 
reside in the nucleus of the cell—as the individual from whom the somatic cell was 
taken.30 
The scientific path of cloning has led through forests of skeptics.  Initially, any 
sort of cloning was considered unachievable.  Even after early  successes in cloning 
amphibians,31 many scientists feared that mammalian cloning—the next significant 
step—would involve enormous technological hurdles, or might even prove impossible.32  
These fears, however, proved to be largely unfounded.  After significant but ultimately 
unsuccessful work on cloning in mice by different groups of scientists,33 in 1996 a team 
led by Ian Wilmut at the Roslyn Institute in Scotland announced the birth of Dolly, the 
first mammal cloned from the adult cells of another mammal.34  Dolly was cloned from a 
mammary cell of an adult ewe; the nucleus from that cell was injected into the egg of a 
different ewe, and the resulting embryo implanted in yet a third ewe; after a successful 
pregnancy, Dolly was born and had both the physical characteristics and the genetic 
markers of the genetic donor, not the egg donor or gestational mother.35  This result met 
                                                           




31 John B. Gurdon, The Developmental Capacity of Nuclei Taken from Intestinal Epithelium 
Cells of Feeding Tadpoles, 10 J. Embryology & Experimental Morphology 622, 622-40 (1962). 
32 Ian Wilmut & Roger Highfield, After Dolly: The Uses and Misuses of Human Cloning 79-
80 (2006). 
33 Id. at 79-80. 
34 Ian Wilmut et al., ViableOoffspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 385 
Nature 810, 810-13 (1997). 
35 Id. 
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with tremendous worldwide media attention, including debates and outcry about the 
possibility of human cloning.36 
Since the cloning of Dolly in 1996, scientists have cloned members of several 
other species, including gaur,37 cat,38 cow,39 mule,40 horse,41 dog,42 and monkey.43  
Cloning is of particular value for agriculture and biotech companies, which can use 
cloning techniques to more reliably make genetically modified organisms.  These cloned 
animals can be used for traditional agricultural purposes, effectively serving as a much 
more advanced form of selective breeding;44 the FDA recently declared the meat from 
cloned animals safe to eat, though it asked producers to voluntarily refrain from 
introducing cloned animal products into the food chain.45  For biotech companies, cloned 
animals can be used in so-called “biopharming,” where transgenic organisms produce 
                                                           
36 For summaries of the media reaction, see Karen Kreeger, Observers Give Mixed Reviews To 
Media's 'Dollymania', 11 The Scientist 1, 1 (1997); Tom Wilkie & Elizabeth Graham, Power 
without Responsibility: Media Portrayals of Dolly and Science, 7 Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics 150-9 (1998). 
37 Robert P. Lanza et al., Cloning of an Endangered Species (Bos gaurus) Using Interspecies 
Nuclear Transfer, 2  Cloning 79, 79-90 (2000). 
38 Taeyoung Shin et al., Cell Biology: a Cat Cloned by Nuclear Transplantation, 415 Nature 
859 (2002). 
39 Arief Boediono et al., Offspring Born from Chimeras Reconstructed from Parthenogenetic 
and In Vitro Fertilized Bovine Embryos, 53 Molecular Reprod. and 159, 159-70 (1999). 
40 Gordon L. Woods et al., a Mule Cloned from Fetal Cells by Nuclear Transfer, 301 Science 
1063 (2003). 
41 Cesare Galli et al., Pregnancy: a Cloned Horse Born to its Dam Twin, 424 Nature 635 
(2003). 
42 Byeong Chun Lee et al., Dogs Cloned from Adult Somatic Cells, 436 Nature 641 (2005). 
43 James A. Byrne et al., Producing Primate Embryonic Stem Cells by Somatic Cell Nuclear 
Transfer, 450  Nature 497, 497-502 (2007). 
44 Raymond L. Page & Sakthikumar Ambady, Animal Cloning Applications in Agriculture, 23 
Engineering in Med. & Biology Magazine 27, 27-31 (2004). 
45 Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Issues Draft Documents on the 
Safety of Animal Clones (Dec. 28, 2006), 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm108819.htm; 
European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 3 Sept. 2008 on the Cloning of Animals 
for Food Supply P6_TA (2008)0400 (2008), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-
0400+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
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pharmaceutically useful products.46  Partly due to these earlier commercial developments, 
and their associated monetary incentives, mammalian cloning is now routine enough that 
companies have offered to commercially clone animals, usually beloved pets, on an 
individual basis.47  The market for this service is still young,48 but as commercial cloning 
becomes more prevalent, the techniques involved will likely rapidly improve. 
B. Technical Challenges and Advances in Human Cloning. 
Human reproductive cloning is yet another significant step past general 
mammalian cloning, with its own technical hurdles and its own corps of skeptics.  At the 
most basic level, for instance, the acquisition of suitable oocytes49 is and will probably 
continue to be one of the most significant challenges to the development of human 
reproductive cloning.50  Oocytes of any sort are expensive to acquire in countries where 
payment is allowed,51 and accordingly rare in countries where payment is illegal.52  
                                                           
46 Götz Laible & David N. Wells, Transgenic Cattle Applications: the Transition from 
Promise to Proof, 22 Biotech. & Genetic Engineering Reviews 125, 125-50 (2006); Brigid 
Brophy et al., Cloned Transgenic Cattle Produce Milk with Higher Levels of Beta-Casein and 
Kappa-Casein, 21  Nature Biotech. 157, 157-62 (2003); Alan Dove, Milking the Genome for 
Profit, 18  Nature Biotech. 1045, 1045-48 (2000); Go-ahead for 'Pharmed' Goat Drug, BBC, 
June 2, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/5041298.stm; Elizabeth Pennisi, After 
Dolly, a Pharming Frenzy, 279  Science 646, 646-8 (1998). 
47 Jon Herskovitz, South Korea's New High Tech Product: Cloned Dogs, July 17, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSELK72270120080717; First order for pet 
dog cloning, BBC, February 15, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7246380.stm; 
RNL Bio - Stem Cell Bank, https://rnl.co.kr/eng/main.asp (last visited December 16, 2008). 
48 Dead Cats to Remain a Memory, Wired News, October 10, 2008, 
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/10/71938 .  
49 An oocyte is an immature egg cell. 
50 Miodrag Stojkovic et al., Derivation of a Human Blastocyst after Heterologous Nuclear 
Transfer to Donated Oocytes, 11  Reprod. BioMedicine Online 226, 226-31 (2005); Vanessa J. 
Hall et al., Developmental Competence of Human In Vitro Aged Oocytes as Host Cells for 
Nuclear Transfer, 22  Human Reprod. 52 (2007); Marie-Cecile Lavoir et al., Poor Development 
of Human Nuclear Transfer Embryos using Failed Fertilized Oocytes, 11  Reprod. BioMedicine 
Online 740, 740-44 (2005). 
51 Bonnie Steinbock, Payment for Egg Donation and Surrogacy, 71  Mt. Sinai J. Med. 255, 
255-65 (2004); Debora Spar, The Egg Trade—Making Sense of the Market for Human Oocytes, 
356  New. Eng. J. Med. 1289, 1289-91 (2007); Gretchen Vogel, Stem Cells: Ethical Oocytes: 
Available for a Price, 313 Science 155 (2006). 
52 Erika Check, Ethicists and Biologists Ponder the Price of Eggs, 442 Nature 606, 606-07 
(2006); Boon Chin Heng, Regulatory Safeguards Needed for the Travelling Foreign Egg Donor, 
22 Human Reprod. 2350, 2350-52 (2007). 
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Compounding the problem, successful human SCNT requires the use of high-quality 
oocytes—that is, mature oocytes from healthy young women.53  This greatly reduces the 
already small pool of potential oocytes available for research.54  Finally, the use of human 
oocytes is highly regulated, making the acquisition of available oocytes slower and more 
burdensome.55   
Also problematic for mammalian cloning in general, and human cloning in 
particular, is the low success rate of cloning experiments to date.  In animal cloning, 
success rates for viable offspring are about 1-2%, and of these, about 30% are born with 
some debilitating condition, such as “large-offspring syndrome.”56  The reasons for this 
low success rate are still not fully understood, though they may involve errors in 
“reprogramming” DNA.57  While a low success rate is not an absolute bar to human 
reproductive cloning—for those seeking to jump the scientific hurdle, one success is 
certainly enough—it is a technical challenge that is likely to at least delay the creation of 
larger numbers of human clones, and to keep human cloning morally disapproved.58 
Not so long ago, clones were confined to the realm of science fiction59 and 
dystopian cinema;60 now, although there have been no verified instances of cloned human 
children being born, cloned human embryos have already been created for research 
                                                           
53 See R. P. Cervera & M. Stojkovic, Commentary: Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer--Progress 
and Promise, 26 Stem Cells 494 (2008); Stojkovic et al., supra note 50; Hall et al., supra note 50; 
Lavoir et al., supra note 50; B. Heindryckx et al., Embryo Development after Successful Somatic 
Cell Nuclear Transfer to In Vitro Matured Human Germinal Vesicle Oocytes, in Human 
Reproduction (2007); Andrew J. French et al., Development of Human Cloned Blastocysts 
following Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT) with Adult Fibroblasts,  26 Stem Cells 485, 
485-93 (2008).  
54 Vogel, supra note 51. 
55 Ingrid Schneider, Oocyte Donation for Reproduction and Research Cloning--the Perils of 
Commodification and the Need for European and International Regulation, 25 Law & Human 
Genome Rev. 205, 205-41(2006). 
56 Cloning Fact Sheet, Human Genome Project Information, 
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/cloning.shtml (last visited July 9, 
2010)http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/cloning.shtml.  Large 
offspring syndrome results in abnormally large offspring, often with significant organ defects.  
See Lorraine E. Young, Kevin D. Sinclair & I. Wilmut, Large Offspring Syndrome in Cattle and 
Sheep, 3 Revs. Reprod. 155, 155-63 (1998).  
57 Teruhiko Wakayama, Production of Cloned Mice and ES Cells from Adult Somatic Cells by 
Nuclear Transfer: How to Improve Cloning Efficiency?, 53 J. Reprod. & Dev. 13, 13-26 (2007). 
58 S. M. Rhind, et al, Human Cloning: Can It Be Made Safe?, 4 Nat. Rev. Genet. 855 
(2003)available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14634633. 
59 See, e.g., Richard Cowper, Clone (1972); Arthur C. Clark, Imperial Earth (1976); Ben Bova, 
The Multiple Man  (1987); A. E. van Vogt, The World of Null-A (2002). 
60 See, e.g., Franklin J. Schaffner, The Boys From Brazil (1999). 
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purposes.  In 2004 and 2005, a Korean research group led by Woo Suk Hwang claimed to 
have created cloned human blastocysts61 (an early stage embryo)—a claim later found to 
be completely fraudulent.62  Shortly afterwards, however, a UK group credibly created 
three cloned embryos from discarded IVF embryos—but they were unsuitable for 
research, and could not produce the cell lines they were designed to produce.63  Finally, 
in January 2008, a California company called Stemagen announced that it had efficiently 
produced human blastocysts cloned from adult somatic cells.64  All of the cloned embryos 
involved in these efforts were created with tremendous and concerted effort by teams of 
scientists, and all were created exclusively for research purposes, so that the cloned 
embryos were not allowed to develop past the blastocyst stage.  Other efforts, however, 
have already aimed to take the embryos much farther.  
In addition to the rigorously validated scientific studies creating cloned human 
embryos for research purposes, other groups have explicitly set their sights—or, at least, 
have announced their intentions—to reproductively clone humans.  On December 28, 
2002, the Raelians, a religious sect based in Canada, announced that they had cloned a 
child named Eve from a human woman.65  They have since claimed that to have cloned 
13 more children, living in secret at undisclosed locations.66  No independent scientists 
have verified these claims, which are now widely dismissed as a hoax.67  Nonetheless, the 
Raelians, and their associated company, Clonaid, maintain a website dedicated to human 
cloning, and claim to offer cloning services for infertile couples, homosexual couples, 
HIV-infected individuals, family members wishing to replace children, or people who 
wish to clone themselves.68  Notably, the Clonaid website does not list its country of 
incorporation, only that it is no longer based in the Bahamas or the U.S.69 
                                                           
61 Woo Suk Hwang et al., Patient-Specific Embryonic Stem Cells Derived from Human SCNT 
Blastocysts, 308 Science 1777, 1777-83 (2005); Woo Suk Hwang et al., Evidence of a Pluripotent 
Human Embryonic Stem Cell Line Derived from a Cloned Blastocyst, 303 Sci. 1669, 1669-74 
(2004). 
62 Donald Kennedy, Editorial Retraction, 311 Science 335, 335 (2006). 
63 Stojkovic et al., supra note 50. 
64 French et al., supra note 53. 
65 Dana Canedy and Kenneth Chang, Group Says Human Clone Was Born to an American, 
N.Y. Times,  December 28, 2002. 
66 Clonaid, News, http://clonaid.com/news.php?3.2.1 (last accessed December 13, 2008). 
67 'Clone' Baby Inquiry Suspended, BBC, January 6, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/2631395.stm. 
68 Clonaid, Clonaid: Pioneers in Human Cloning, http://clonaid.com (last accessed December 
8, 2008). 
69 Clonaid, History, http://clonaid.com/page.php?7 (last accessed December 8, 2008). 
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Aside from the unverified claims of the Raelians/Clonaid, other researchers have 
claimed significant progress in creating validated human reproductive clones.  In March 
2001, three doctors from the International Cloning Consortium announced that they were 
ready to begin human cloning to allow infertile couples to have genetically related 
children.70  The consortium claimed a woman was eight weeks pregnant with a cloned 
human embryo in April 2002.71  But, during a later announcement that three women were 
pregnant with clones in November 2002, no mention was made of the first woman; the 
group’s claims were widely greeted with skepticism.72  No verified cloned baby has been 
revealed by the Consortium.  Although neither the Consortium nor the Raelians/Clonaid 
have had a successful clone verified, their existence, support, and stated purpose are 
evidence of a strong desire among at least some groups to clone humans. 
C. Inadequate Federal and State Legislation Focused on Prohibition 
Comprehensive bans on reproductive cloning have been introduced several times 
in the U.S. Congress.73  However, this legislation has yet to succeed, meaning that 
reproductive cloning remains free of federal law or regulation.  Efforts to ban 
reproductive cloning have failed largely because of legislative inability to separate 
reproductive cloning from the issue of therapeutic cloning—that is, the creation of an 
early-stage clone of a person to use for individually matched organ provision or medical 
treatment.74  While most legislators are opposed to reproductive cloning, there are 
substantial differences in opinion on therapeutic cloning, and the continuing 
entanglement of the two, in policy debates if not necessarily in scientific discourse, has 
                                                           
70 Roger Moorgate, Report on the Human Cloning Conference (2001), available at  
http://library.thinkquest.org/C0121981/pages/g_report.htm.  
71 Emma Young & Damian Carrington, Cloning Pregnancy Claim Prompts Outrage, New 
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72 'Human Clone' Unlikely Say Experts, BBC, November 27, 2002, 
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73 See, inter alia, Human Cloning Ban and Stem Cell Research Protection Act of 2007, S. 812, 
110th Congress (2007); Human Cloning Ban and Stem Cell Research Protection Act of 2005, S. 
876, H.R. 1822, 109th Congress (2005); Human Cloning Ban and Stem Cell Research Protection 
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74 Zhiming Han, Catherine A. Vandevoort & Keith E. Latham, Therapeutic Cloning: Status 
and Prospects, 9  Current Opinion in Molecular Therapeutics 392, 392-97 (2007). 
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led to legislative gridlock on the larger subject of human cloning.75  Unsurprisingly, as 
Congress has failed to enact blanket bans or permissions regarding human cloning, it has 
also failed to enact any regulation or law on the practical situations of eventual human 
clones, whether focused on parental status or otherwise.  It is likely that any 
Congressional efforts in this area would be bounded by federalism concerns, since family 
and property law are generally the purview of the states; the issue is nearly moot, 
however, since comprehensive regulatory action by Congress appears extremely unlikely 
in the near future. 
In the absence of comprehensive federal regulation on human cloning, many 
states have enacted their own laws completely or partially banning cloning.76  Thirteen 
states have completely banned reproductive cloning,77 while two have prohibited the use 
of public funds for the purpose of reproductive cloning.78  As a result of the focus on 
banning human clones, rather than addressing the situation of the future children that may 
arise from cloning, no state has enacted any sort of legislation directly considering the 
complex issues raised by human clones.  The California Court of Appeals laid out the 
human risks to this approach when considering a complex surrogacy parentage tangle: 
No matter what one thinks of artificial insemination, traditional and 
gestational surrogacy (in all its permutations), and—as now appears in the 
not-too-distant future, cloning and even gene splicing—courts are still 
going to be faced with the problem of determining lawful parentage. A 
child cannot be ignored. Even if all means of artificial reproduction were 
outlawed with draconian criminal penalties visited on the doctors and 
parties involved, courts will still be called upon to decide who the lawful 
parents really are and who—other than the taxpayers—is obligated to 
provide maintenance and support for the child. These cases will not go 
away. 79 
 
In addition to the practical and human problems of considering clones only from 
the point of view of prohibition, this myopic focus has obscured the ways clones change 
                                                           
75 George J. Annas, Cloning and the U.S. Congress, 346 New. Eng. J. Med. 1599, 1599-1602 
(2002); Tabitha M. Powledge, Will They Throw the Bath Water out with the Baby?: The US 
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conceptions of family.  The next section of this Article aims to explicitly consider both 
the practical and conceptual effects of human cloning on the modern family.  
III. HUMAN CLONING AND THE COMMON LAW OF COMPLEX PARENTAGE. 
The advent of current reproductive technologies, most significantly in vitro 
fertilization, and the surrogacy disputes that come with them, have given courts cause to 
more carefully consider the need for new definitions of the parent-child relationship.  One 
leading and oft-cited line of cases, coming from California, holds that contested 
parentage should be determined by procreative-intent instead of the traditional amalgam 
of marriage, acknowledgement, or genetic paternity testing.80  Another significant set of 
cases, originating with Ohio courts, has taken the genetic relationship to be paramount in 
situations of contested parenthood, ruling that the question of natural parentage should be 
determined solely on the basis of genetics.81  The situation of human cloning—and the 
posited application of these tests to eventual human clones—reveals problems in these 
approaches unconsidered by the courts that developed them.  The procreative intent test 
more flexibly fits around the contours of human cloning, and might be better at 
addressing future changes in reproductive technology, but at the same time it removes the 
biological constraints which limit cloning’s potentially reprehensible possibilities.  On 
the other hand, human clones demonstrate that the desirable simplicity of the pure 
genetics approach is actually not simple at all.  Its application to human clones does not 
resolve the intuitional conflict of different human cloning situations, and its inability to 
resolve them shows a deeper and more problematic ambiguity in the definition of 
“genetic parent.”  In a broader sense, human cloning exemplifies the ways in which 
changing science and technology confound the courts’ attempts to turn to science for 
consistent truths on which to found easily applicable rules in hard situations. 
A. Importance of the Legal Parent-Child Relationship 
We readily acknowledge the everyday significance of the parent-child 
relationship, but that relationship is usually conceived in a social context.  If the primary 
importance of a parent-child relationship exists on a social and personal level, what 
impact does a legal definition of that relationship have?  Cases like Rob and Junior are 
easily resolved at the level of instinct and intuition, and that may be what matters most in 
everyday life.  In several important respects, however, the legally defined parent-child 
relationship can have significant impacts on the life of both parties. 
A legal determination of parentage establishes both rights and responsibilities for 
the parents.  In terms of rights and benefits, legal parents have the right of custody of 
their children, and can determine to a significant extent the progress of their child’s 
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education and upbringing.82  Within limits,83 parents can essentially control their children 
via legal means.84  More generally, legal parents have significant protection from 
interference in their child-rearing, whether by third parties or the state.85   Parental 
responsibilities are also significant; parents must provide shelter, food, medical care, 
clothing, and other necessities for their children;86 parents who are not involved in the 
day-to-day rearing of their children are usually obligated to pay child support.87   
For children, the legal parent-child relationship provides more in the way of 
benefits than responsibilities.  Children benefit from the receipt of the parental 
obligations discussed above, including food and other necessities.88  Outside of those 
necessities, children can derive other benefits from the legal parent-child relationship, 
including citizenship,89 medical insurance coverage,90 Social Security survivor benefits,91 
and, potentially, inherited property in situations of intestacy.92  Children have little in the 
way of legal responsibilities towards their parents, instead submitting to a significant 
amount of control over daily life, and bearing potential social responsibility for the 
eventual elder-care. 
                                                           
82 See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 
702 (1997); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); 
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83 Id.; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1352 
(11th Cir. 2000) (applying Florida law). 
84 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and Child § 17. 
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87 Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102. 
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interesting questions in the area of posthumously conceived children inheriting or receiving 
Social Security survivorship benefits. See generally Joesph H. Karlin, Daddy Can You Spare a 
Dime: Intestate Heir Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 79 Temp. L. Rev. 1317 (2006).  
In normal situations of posthumous conception, the deceased parent consented at some point to 
the storage of eggs or sperm, while in cloning situations this minimal reproductive consent can be 
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Overall, the legal parent-child relationship has significant benefits and costs on 
both sides.  It may not carry the full panoply of implications that social assignment of 
parentage does, but it greatly influences the lives of all involved.  At a level both broader 
and deeper, though, legal and social conceptions of parentage and the family influence 
each other over time.93  The law can create legitimacy which becomes more widely 
accepted socially only later94 or illegitimacy which leads to similar later social 
disapprobation.95  Alternatively, some social change generally occurs, and is often 
necessary, before the law even takes notice of a problem, much less shifts its definition.96  
Establishing a causal relationship between legal and social change requires often-
impossible disaggregation of intertwined effects, but that does not mean the 
interrelationship should be ignored.  Instead, the potential social ramifications—and 
potential legal-social cyclical synergies, where changes in the two spheres reinforce and 
support each other over time—should lead us to even more closely examine changes in 
the law’s definition of such socially definitive forms as the constitution of the family and 
individuals’ identities as parents and children. 
B. The Procreative-Intent Test and Its Problems. 
Recently, courts in California have instituted just such changes in defining 
parents, moving away from definitions based in the traditional grounds of marriage and 
conception and relying instead on the procreative intent of the potential parents.  
Traditionally in Anglo-American law, parentage has been largely defined by marriage.97  
At common law, the mother of a child was easily determined, since before the advent of 
assisted reproductive technologies birth clearly established both gestational and genetic 
motherhood.  Legal fatherhood was determined by marriage to the legal mother, which 
remains applicable today as the marital presumption;98  marriage and birth still determine 
the legal parentage of a large proportion of children.  More recently, legal definitions of 
                                                           
93 For a general theory of the interactions between law and social norms, see Eric A. Posner, 
Law and Social Norms 272 (2002). 
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fathers have come to encompass biological parentage outside the context of marriage, 
including voluntary acknowledgement of paternity outside the context of marriage, and 
DNA testing to demonstrate biological paternity—whether voluntarily acknowledged or 
not—inside or outside of a marriage.99  These traditional definitions, based on birth, 
marriage, acknowledgement of paternity, and DNA testing to establish some version of 
biological paternity, have clearly defined the vast majority of parentage cases, and appear 
likely to continue to do so.  They do not, however, cover all circumstances which can 
arise in the complex modern interplay between evolving technology and social 
relationships.    
This lack of comprehensiveness becomes apparent in Johnson v. Calvert, where 
the California Supreme Court addressed a complex surrogacy situation not amenable to 
traditional definitions.  Mark and Crispina Calvert were a married couple who wished to 
have a child genetically related to them (i.e., not adopted), but Crispina had undergone a 
hysterectomy.100  They signed a surrogacy contract with Anna Johnson, and an embryo 
formed from Mark’s sperm and Crispina’s egg was implanted in Anna’s uterus.101  Anna 
agreed to forego all parental rights  and to be paid by the Calverts for her gestational 
surrogacy.102  After a deterioration of the relationship between Anna and the Calverts, 
each side sought declaratory judgment affirming parentage.103  The court decided that: 
“[A]lthough the [Uniform Parentage] Act recognizes both genetic 
consanguinity and giving birth as a means of establishing a mother and 
child relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman, she 
who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who intended to bring 
about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own—is the 
natural mother under California law.”104   
 
The court reasoned that the intending parents were the first movers, the “but-for” 
causative agents, without whom the child would not have come into existence at all;105 
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100 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993). 
101 Id. at 778. 
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105 Johnson, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (citing John L. Hill, What Does it Mean to be a 
"Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 370 
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that bargained-for expectations about who would be parents should be controlling;106 that 
the parents were the originators of the mental concept of the child;107 and, finally, that the 
interests of the child are more likely to be aligned with the interests of the individuals 
who intended to bring the child into being.108  On these grounds, the court held that the 
genetic mother, and not the gestational mother, was the natural and legal mother.  
The Johnson opinion, and the procreative-intent test it laid out, has been criticized 
on several grounds.109  Perhaps most fundamentally, in other contexts the courts have no 
problem assigning parentage without intent, most particularly in the recognition of 
paternity on the purely biological grounds of a DNA test.110  Indeed, courts have assigned 
parentage where intent was actively denied, and in which the biological father had no 
desire to be a legal parent.111  To use procreative-intent as a determinative test for natural 
parentage in complex assisted reproductive systems seems, if not actively contradictory 
to biological determination of parentage, at least evidence of a countervailing policy 
argument.   
Several other criticisms were levied against the opinion, most immediately in the 
dissenting opinion by Justice Kennard.112  In his opinion, he pointed out several problems 
with the majority’s reasoning:  that gestational mothers are also certainly substantial 
causes of the child’s coming into being;113 that both bargaining and concept origination 
rationales tend to treat children as property;114 and, finally, that the interests of the child 
can best be addressed by considering them directly, instead of considering the interests of 
                                                           
106 Id. at 783 (citing Marjorie Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: 
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110 Unif. Parentage Act § 505 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 309 (Supp. 2009). 
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the parents as an automatic proxy.115  The dissent also pointed out that permitting intent 
to control natural parentage determinations in surrogacy agreements effectively approves 
surrogacy agreements,116 but without the procedural safeguards which are mandated in 
adoption situations and suggested in surrogacy situations.117  This, Justice Kennard 
argued, opens the door to substantial possibilities of abuse.118  These criticisms, while not 
as fundamentally challenging as the frequent exclusive use of biology to assign parentage 
in other circumstances, nonetheless question the use of reproductive intent as a panacea 
for problems resolving complex reproductive situations. 
Despite these challenges, the Johnson procreative-intent test seems to resolve the 
issues that arise with genetic parentage assignment in the cloning paradigm cases of 
replacement children and infertile couples.  The test was developed and applied in the 
situation of an infertile couple wishing a genetically related child (Junior), and its result 
there accords with our intuition, since the infertile couple intends to have the child.  
Furthermore, the procreative intent test result matches our intuition with a replacement 
child (Rob) —there, the deceased child’s interposition within the genetic relationship has 
no effect on the assignment of natural parentage, because the intuitive parents intended to 
have the child.  The procreative-intent test neatly resolves the disparity between intuition 
and biology by removing biology from the picture, which in this situation seems to cause 
few problems. 
The Johnson holding, however, has been applied in California significantly 
beyond its original fact pattern, and its broader applications as a parentage test are 
challenged by the possibility of human cloning.  The original holding—that procreative 
intent can function as a tiebreaker between genetic and gestational parentage—was 
broadened in In re Marriage of Buzzanca.119  There, the Buzzancas, unable to conceive 
children on their own, used anonymously donated sperm and eggs to create an embryo, 
which was then implanted in a surrogate.120  Later, the marriage soured, and none of the 
three original principals wished to be the parent of the child.121  The Fourth District Court 
of Appeal ruled that the procreative-intent test from Johnson controlled, and that the 
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Buzzancas were the parents based on that original procreative-intent, even though they 
had neither genetic nor gestational relationships to the child.122 
This application to situations where the intending parents have neither genetic nor 
gestational relationships with the child—that is, where there is no biological basis to the 
relationship—raises novel issues in the context of human cloning.  In all other forms of 
parentage, there are controls on the potential parents’ ability to choose a child.  In 
adoption cases, the state strictly supervises the assignment of parentage.123  In other 
forms of natural parentage, parents are limited in their choice by the vagaries of genetics 
in combining contributions from two individuals—whether themselves or known or 
anonymous donors—and, in the case of gestational motherhood, by the biology of 
gestation itself.  With human clones, and under the procreative-intent test, these 
constraints vanish; parents are natural parents of whomever they may clone and a 
surrogate may bear.  This would mean, to take an extreme example, that a set of parents 
who contracted with twenty surrogates to bear clones of twenty dictators would, in fact, 
be the natural legal parents of those clones.  It may seem a slight defense against abusive 
procreative cloning to state merely that some biological relationship is required alongside 
intent, but on the other hand, legal recognition of the parent-child relationship by a 
judicial test could offer a powerful approbation of behavior generally deemed 
reprehensible.  Less immediately but more significantly, judicial approval of otherwise 
problematic practices may lead to changes in social norms and eventual acceptance, as 
discussed above.124 
Another aspect of the same problem arises from the notion of consent.  Strong 
arguments have been made for the right of an individual to consent to the use of his or her 
genetic material in the creation of a child.125  Use of genetic material without consent 
                                                           
122 Id. 
123 See, e.g., N.Y. State Office of Children & Family Servs., The Adoption Process, 
http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/adopt/process.asp (last visited July 9, 2010). 
124 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
125 Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 766 (Ohio Ct. Pleas 1994) (“The procreation of a child, 
that is, the replication of the unique genes of an individual, should occur only with the consent of 
that individual.”) (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601-02 (Tenn. 1992) (“[H]owever far 
the protection of procreational autonomy extends . . . decisional authority rests in the gamete-
providers alone, at least to the extent that their decisions have an impact upon their individual 
reproductive status.”)).  In Canada, this consent requirement is clarified by statute: 
 
(1) No person shall make use of human reproductive material for the purpose of 
creating an embryo unless the donor of the material has given written consent, in 
accordance with the regulations, to its use for that purpose. 
(2) No person shall remove human reproductive material from a donor's body 
after the donor's death for the purpose of creating an embryo unless the donor of 
the material has given written consent, in accordance with the regulations, to its 
removal for that purpose. 
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raises complex issues of autonomy on the one hand and appropriation on the other, 
though the latter argument brings up troublesome shades of commodification.  When 
human clones are involved, the matter becomes more pressing, since rather than a 
random selection of genetic material, the genetic donor provides essentially126 the entire 
genetic complement for the new individual.  These issues are absent from the Johnson 
decision, which is unsurprising since consent was present.  A procreative-intent rule 
without a genetic consent requirement, however, has problems for parentage 
determination in general and for clones in particular. 
Practically speaking, in addition to challenges of administration, the combination 
of an intent test with cloning opens new potentially problematic forms of parenthood.  
Overall, however, the Johnson intent test effectively skirts some of the theoretical 
complexities raised by human clones; where cloning points toward insufficient 
disaggregation of biological parentage, Johnson avoids the problem by prioritizing 
instead the social side of parentage.  Despite this theoretical elegance, recognition of the 
intent test’s administrative difficulties has led other courts to the development of a 
different test designed for simpler answers. 
C. The Direct Genetic Test and Its Problems 
In lieu of potentially complicated determinations of procreative-intent, reliance on 
genetics as the determinant of parentage offers an attractive simplicity in situations of 
complex potential parent-child relationships, including when the genetic and gestational 
mother are different individuals.  In Ohio, the courts have embraced this apparent 
simplicity.  In Belsito v. Clark, Shelly Belsito was unable to bear children due to a 
hysterectomy; however, her egg and her husband’s sperm were used to create an embryo 
which was implanted in her sister, Carol Clark.127  Carol stated that she had no desire to 
be the child’s mother and would be no more than the child’s aunt.128  Under Ohio law at 
the time the gestational mother would be named the mother on the birth certificate, and 
since Carol Clark was not married to Anthony Belsito, the child would be considered 
illegitimate, with no father on the birth certificate.129  To avoid this, and the necessity of 
adopting their genetic child, Shelly and Anthony requested a declaratory judgment that 
                                                                                                                                                                               
(3) No person shall make use of an in vitro embryo for any purpose unless the 
donor has given written consent, in accordance with the regulations, to its use for 
that purpose. 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2004 S.C., cl. 2, § 8 (Can.).  Notably, the same statute 
explicitly bans any human cloning in Canada. Id. at § 5(1). 
126 See infra Part III.C.2 for a discussion of the genetic differences between clones and their 
genetic donor.  
127 Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 761 (Ohio Ct. Pleas 1994). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 762. 
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they were the genetic parents of the child.130  The court granted their judgment, holding 
that “[t]he test to identify the natural parents should be, ‘Who are the genetic 
parents?’”131   
The Belsito court’s reasoning had three stated major prongs:  the difficulty in 
applying an intent-based test, the right of a genetic parent to consent to procreation or 
surrender potential parental rights, and public policy concerns about privately contracting 
the surrender of parental rights and about state-supervised adoption.132  The court’s 
reasoning has been criticized on several grounds;133 this Article will not rework those 
prior critiques.  Instead, it will turn to the ways in which the unconsidered situation of 
human cloning illustrates the problems in the underlying assumptions of the Belsito 
decision to rely on genetics.  More specifically, the Belsito court recognized that 
biological parentage could be not only split from social parentage but further divided into 
gestational and genetic parentage, and chose to set the onus of complex parentage entirely 
on the genetic aspect of biological parentage.  Human clones, though, demonstrate that 
genetic parentage itself is a malleable concept, still divisible and devoid of the simplicity 
sought in Belsito’s turn to scientific definition.  
1. The Inadequate Definition of “Genetic Parent” 
A significant rationale for the Belsito decision was the clarity of a genetic test.  
Genetically, every individual is defined by two sets of 23 matched chromosomes, each 
taken from one individual as a set.  For all reproduction besides cloning—that is, all 
sexual reproduction134—one set obviously comes from each parent.  These individuals 
can be determined through genetic testing, as in situations of uncertain paternity.  The 
definition of “genetic parents,” therefore, is relatively uncontested up to this point; there 
has been little reason to argue over precision.135 When human clones are considered, the 
definition of “genetic parents” becomes a central and immediate issue.  Different possible 
definitions and their strengths will be discussed in more detail in Part V.A, infra, but for 
the current discussion, the analysis will assume the definition the Belsito court most 
probably had in mind.  Based on the court’s description of genetics as a modern view of 
                                                           
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 766. 
132 Id. at 764. 
133 See, e.g., Michelle Pierce-Gealy, “Are You My Mother?”: Ohio's Crazy-Making Baby-
Making Produces a New Definition of “Mother”, 28 Akron L. Rev. 535 (1994). 
134 Sexual reproduction here refers to a broader swath of activity than merely intercourse, 
describing any reproduction which involves the combination of half-genomes from two 
individuals to create a full genome.  In this sense, sexual reproduction differs from asexual 
reproduction methods like budding of yeast cells, bacterial fission (splitting in half), the original 
cloning (taking twigs from trees to grow new trees), or modern technological cloning. 
135 This Footnote is a placeholder. 
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blood relations, and the analysis of genetic traits as evidence of parentage, the most likely 
definition of “genetic parents” would point to the two individuals who contributed the 
two sets of chromosomes. However, consideration of the two archetypal cases from this 
Article’s beginning show the problem with this apparently reasonable definition. 
For Rob, the “replacement child,” the Belsito test gives results that match our 
intuition.  Since Rob derives both sets of chromosomes from the deceased child, he will 
have one set of chromosomes from each of the original parents; the genetic relationship is 
identical to that of the deceased child, which matches both the parents’ intent and our 
external intuition.  For Junior, however, this logic gives a counterintuitive and counter-
intentional answer:  since Junior is genetically identical to the cloned member of the 
couple, he is the genetic child of the genetic donor’s parents—that is, the individuals we 
would intuitively consider his paternal grandparents.  Another potential example—
admittedly more extreme and less sympathetic—shows the bizarre potential results of the 
test.  In the case of a third party clone of a previously unrelated individual, like the score 
of dictator replicas posited above, the clone would remain the genetic child of the original 
individual’s genetic parents, who may have no relation whatsoever to the individuals who 
proximally caused the clone to be made and born.  Even were these counterintuitive 
results acceptable, though, consideration of human clones raises further issues regarding 
the complexity of genetic parentage assignment by demonstrating that even when 
individuals are as close to identical as science can make them, genetic differences still 
arise. 
2. Genetic Differences Between Clones and Donors 
All but the most dystopian descriptions of clones recognize that clones will not be 
identical to their donors because of differing environmental variables.136  These include 
in utero nutrient variations, parenting patterns, or any of the other myriad factors broadly 
classified as the “nurture” of “nature vs. nurture.”137  Even identical twins raised in the 
same family are not actually identical,138 and those are closer clones than any artificial 
clones could ever be, since they share both in utero and developmental environments.  In 
animals, the first commercially cloned cat was compared at one year from birth with its 
                                                           
136 For examples of the many studies examining environmental and genetic factors impacting 
differences between identical twins, see, e.g., Dorret Boomsma, Andreas Busjahn & Lenna 
Peltonen, Classical Twin Studies and Beyond, 3 Nature Revs. Genetics 872, 872-882 (2002); 
Jaakko Kaprio & Markku Koskenvuo, Genetic and Environmental Factors in Complex Diseases: 
The Older Finnish Twin Cohort, 5 Twin Res. & Human Genetics 358, 358-65 (2002); John C. 
Loehlin & Robert C. Nichols, Heredity, Environment, & Personality: A Study of 850 Sets of 
Twins (1976); Hans J. Eysenck, Genetic and Environmental Contributions to Individual 
Differences: The Three Major Dimensions of Personality, 58 J. Personality 245, 245-61 (1990). 
137 See supra note 134.  
138 Gregory A. Machin, Some Causes of Genotypic and Phenotypic Discordance in 
Monozygotic Twin Pairs, 61 Am. J. Med. Genetics 216, 216-28 (1996). 
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genetic progenitor, and significant differences were noted.139 Aside from the “nurture” 
factors—that is, external environmental variables—it is important to note that the 
“nature” factors, including the core genetic factors, are not completely identical between 
clones.140  Two differences, mitochondrial DNA and epigenetic gene programming, 
separate most artificial clones at the genetic level, and further complicate the conception 
of genetic relationships used in Belsito. 
Contrary to common belief, DNA exists in the cell outside the nucleus.  The 
nucleus houses the twenty-three pairs of chromosomes that are normally thought of as the 
genetic makeup of an individual—but several significant genes are found outside the 
nucleus in the cell’s mitochondria.  Mitochondria are small organelles that, among other 
functions, produce energy for the cell.141  Unlike other mammalian organelles, 
mitochondria have their own DNA, which is used in addition to the DNA in the cell’s 
nucleus to produce mitochontrial proteins.142  In fact, mitochondrial DNA codes for 
thirteen mitochondrial protein products and twenty-four mitochondrial RNA genes.143  
Since mitochondrial DNA is located in the mitochondria, not in the nucleus, and sperm 
only contribute nuclear DNA, a fertilized egg gets its mitochondrial DNA exclusively 
from the mother.  Similarly, the egg used as the recipient of a new nucleus in an instance 
of cloning via SNT likewise carries mitochondrial DNA from the woman who produced 
the egg, not from the donor of the nucleus and the rest of the cell’s genetic material. 
This has potentially significant implications for the clone in physical terms, since 
variations in mitochondrial DNA have been linked with longevity144 and several disease 
conditions.145  However, in terms of sheer informational volume, mitochondrial DNA is 
                                                           
139 1 Year Later: Cat, Clone Differ,  USA Today, January 21, 2003, available at  
http://www.usatoday.com/news/science/2003-01-21-cloned-cats_x.htm. 
140 For a more technical overview of this topic, see R. G. Edwards & Helen K. Beard, How 
Identical Would Cloned Children Be? An Understanding Essential to the Ethical Debate, 4 
Human Reprod. Update 791, 791-811 (1998). 
141 Heidi M. McBride, Margaret Neuspiel & Sylwia Wasiak, Mitochondria: More Than Just a 
Powerhouse, 16 Current Biology R551, R551-60 (2006). 
142 S. Anderson et al., Sequence and Organization of the Human Mitochondrial Genome, 290 
Nature 457, 457-65 (1981) 
143 Id. 
144 Stefano Salvioli et al., The Impact of Mitochondrial DNA on Human Lifespan: a View from 
Studies on Centenarians, 3 Biotech. J. 740, 740-49 (2008); Aurelia Santoro et al., Mitochondrial 
DNA Involvement in Human Longevity, 1757 Biochimica Et Biophysica Acta 1388, 1388-99 
(2006). 
145 Robert W. Taylor & Doug M. Turnbull, Mitochondrial DNA Mutations in Human 
Diseases, 6 Nature Revs. Genetics 389, 389–402 (2005); Salvatore Dimauro & Eric A. Schon, 
Mitochondrial DNA and Diseases of the Nervous System: The Spectrum, 4 Neuroscientist 53, 53-
63 (1998); Andrew M. Schaefer et al., Prevalence of Mitochondrial DNA Disease in Adults, 63 
Annals of Neurology 35, 35-39 (2008). 
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dwarfed by a cell’s nuclear genetic component.  The human genome has over 20,000 
protein coding genes,146 meaning that mitochondrial DNA codes for well less than 1% of 
human genes.  This leads to the again counterintuitive result that in terms of absolute 
information, an individual is defined almost exclusively by nuclear DNA—but the little 
information held in mitochondrial DNA can still have life-altering implications.  Here 
again, the example of human clones shows the ambiguousness of supposedly clear 
genetic definitions, and how those can prove practically unworkable with new 
reproductive technologies. 
Aside from the genetic differences of mitochondrial/nuclear DNA, relatively 
recently discovered factors can result in heritable changes which are not genetic in nature.  
The developing field of epigenetics studies changes in gene expression which are based 
on anything besides a change in the underlying DNA sequence.147  This includes 
modifications made to a cell’s DNA which can influence, among other things, which 
copy of a gene (maternal or paternal) is activated, or which of multiple possible genetic 
disease syndromes occurs,148 all of which have potentially life-changing effects on 
offspring.  Epigenetics can even lead to heritable changes based on parental life events—
famine, food abundance, and the onset of smoking have all been shown to have trans-
generational effects without any change in DNA.149  This starts to call into question the 
use of genetics itself as an all-encompassing term for biological heritability,150 and shakes 
yet again the underpinnings of the Belsito test’s sought clarity. 
Clones, and the scientific changes for which they stand proxy, show the serious 
problems with both specific approaches to determinations of complex parentage.  Cloning 
allows a procreative-intent test to determine situations far beyond the recent changes to 
the traditional family, leaving open the possibility of completely biologically 
unconnected individuals being considered legal parents without any state oversight or 
intervention.  The opposite approach, focusing purely on genetic connections, has even 
deeper problems revealed by considering human clones, since the blunt concept of a 
“genetic parent” is neither clear nor constant, especially in light of constantly changing 
                                                           
146 Int’l Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, Finishing the Euchromatic Sequence of the 
Human Genome, 431 Nature 931, 931-45  (2004). 
147 See generally C. David Allis et al., Epigenetics (1st ed. 2007). 
148 Id. 
149 Marcus E Pembrey et al., Sex-Specific, Male-Line Transgenerational Responses in 
Humans, 14 Eur. J. Human Genetics 159, 159-66 (2006). 
150 Recent studies have made this point explicit, examining differences between genetically 
identical organisms which arise from epigenetic differences.  See, e.g., Art Petronis, Epigenetics 
and Twins: Three Variations on the Theme, 22 Trends in Genetics 347, 347-50 (2006); M ario F. 
Fraga et al., From The Cover: Epigenetic Differences Arise During the Lifetime of Monozygotic 
Twins, 102 Proc. Nat'l Acad. Scis. 10604, 10604 (2005); Art Petronis et al., Monozygotic Twins 
Exhibit Numerous Epigenetic Differences: Clues to Twin Discordance?, 29 Schizophrenia 
Bulletin 169, 169 (2003); Albert H. C. Wong, Irving I. Gottesman & Art Petronis, Phenotypic 
Differences in Genetically Identical Organisms: the Epigenetic Perspective., 14 Human 
Molecular Genetics R11, R11 (2005). 
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science.  The problems in defining modern parenthood, however, are not limited to these 
two approaches:  the general framework underlying these decisions demonstrates the 
same sort of concerns. 
IV. STEPPING BACK: CLONES AND THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT. 
 Clones demonstrate the problems with specific common law approaches to 
determining parentage, but they also reveal the challenges in creating a comprehensive 
framework from which courts can work.  The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) was drafted 
in 2000 to carefully and comprehensively define the parent-child relationship.151  In 
response to a federal mandate to provide a way to determine paternity, it has been 
adopted in large part by 9 states; all other states have enacted some earlier form of a 
uniform parentage act, none of which are broader in their sweep over assisted 
reproduction issues.152  Even the broadest outlines of the UPA, however, show the 
problems of basing comprehensive legislation on the grounding of shifting science.  The 
UPA’s structure centers on an amalgam of traditional marriage and voluntary 
acknowledgement, codifying the definitions the California courts found essentially 
inadequate in Johnson.  Even when the UPA addresses modern technology, in sections on 
assisted reproduction and gestational agreements, it remains grounded in the technology 
of the present and the past, lacking the deep reconceptualization needed for true 
comprehensiveness.  Practically, for human clones, this means that they either fall into 
some category by virtue of other characteristics, or that they slip through the cracks of the 
statutory conception.  Conceptually, much of the problem stems from the law’s repeated 
focus on viewing genetic relationships as a clearly defined component of traditional 
parentage sources, and not as the set of the malleable definitions that clones show them to 
be. 
Marriage provides the most traditional way to determine parentage within the 
UPA—birth and the marital presumption determine parentage for many children, as has 
long been the case.  When human cloning functions merely as a novel assisted 
reproduction technique within the context of a marriage, the UPA clearly assigns 
parentage of the clone to the married couple.  If a clone is implanted into a wife, the 
mother-child relationship will be established by her carrying the child to term,153 and her 
husband will be the legal father under the marital presumption.154  Clones within a 
marriage are covered, then, but not by virtue of consideration of their special and 
different characteristics.  Instead, they fit into a preexisting category without considering 
                                                           
151 Unif. Parentage Act § 201 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 309 (Supp. 2009); see also J. Brad 
Reich & Dawn Swink, You Can't Put the Genie Back in the Bottle: Potential Rights and 
Obligations of Egg Donors in the Cyberprocreation Era, 20 Alb. L. J. Sci. & Tech. 1, 26 (2010). 
152 See Reich & Swink, supra note 150, at 26. 
153 Unif. Parentage Act § 201(a)(1) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 309 (Supp. 2009). 
154 Id. at § 204(a)(1-4). 
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whether other factors—genetic relationships, consent of the genetic donor, or other social 
features—should influence their categorization. 
Outside the marital presumption, the primary method of establishing the legal 
father-child relationship under the UPA is a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity.155  
However, the language of the section reveals its inextricability from traditional forms of 
begetting:  this section only allows voluntary acknowledgement by “a man claiming to be 
the father of the child conceived as the result of his sexual intercourse with the 
mother.”156  In the situation of human reproductive cloning, as with any other assisted 
reproductive technology, this is obviously not the case, since no sexual intercourse is 
involved in the conception of the child.   
Once situations outside the ambit of traditional parentage questions—marriage or 
children otherwise conceived through sexual intercourse—arise, the language of the UPA 
struggles to conceptualize the application of science to create lasting definitions.  In 
particular, the UPA includes sections on both assisted reproduction and gestational 
agreements—but these sections are so firmly rooted in the science at the time of drafting 
that they form an exceptionally poor fit to the circumstances of human clones. 
Article 7 of the UPA governs parentage in situations of assisted reproduction, and 
would therefore be the most likely section to govern the parentage of human clones.  But 
Article 7 focuses only on assisted reproduction involving a sperm and an egg.157  The 
language fails to anticipate future reproductive techniques, and this problem arises 
immediately, since cloning does not involve the union of a sperm and an egg.  Even in 
trying to expand beyond traditional conceptions, the UPA clings to that tradition, using it 
to define and encapsulate the science of the day. 
Likewise, Article 8 of the UPA governs gestational agreements, where a woman 
agrees to carry a child to term for another set of parents.  This situation, too, is quite 
likely to arise in human cloning, particularly in the context of couples where neither 
member can carry the child.  Normally, a gestational agreement can be enforced, and will 
legally establish parent-child relationships for the couple in the agreement.158  However, 
for a gestational agreement to be enforced, a court must approve it beforehand.159  Given 
that human reproductive cloning is currently widely disfavored, it seems quite unlikely 
that any early cases of human clones will be brought to the courts before the cloning and 
gestation take place.   
Essentially, the UPA attempts comprehensiveness by encirclement of the 
possibilities envisaged at the time of drafting, relying heavily on the science of the time.  
Specifically with regard to the genetic component of parentage, the UPA assumes as 
settled a set of definitions that can and will shift over time.  As science changes, and with 
it the amalgam of aggregated definitions it grounds, the UPA is left behind, leaving 
                                                           
155 Id. at Art. 3. 
156 Id. at § 301. 
157 Id. at §§ 703, 706-07. 
158 Under the UPA, there must be two parents in a gestational agreement. Id. at § 801(b).  
159 Unif. Parentage Act § 809(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 309 (Supp. 2009).  
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courts with little statutory grounding to address the complexities of these situations once 
they inevitably arise.   
V.  IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The social and genetic complexities of human clones reveal problems in the 
underlying concepts of family relationships, as well as both general and specific ways of 
determining legal parentage.  Aside from the clear failure of the UPA’s attempt at a 
comprehensive framework, human clones problematize both the procreative-intent test 
and the pure-genetics test—but these problems sit at opposite ends of the judicial process.  
Clones challenge the pure-genetics test at the most basic level, the definitions which 
provide the conceptual grounding for even considering the phrase “genetic parents,” 
before any weighing or balancing by the courts.  Cloning complicates the procreative-
intent test, on the other hand, by shifting incentives for potential parents and by adding 
new potential factors that could arise in a court’s analysis.  In both conceptual locales, a 
consideration of cloning requires a reexamination of what we view as the key elements of 
parentage, especially if defined biologically.  Which approach to determining complex 
parentage provides a better answer to changing technology depends on which approach 
better allows courts—and society—to flexibly address those changes while maintaining 
conceptual and jurisprudential consistency. 
A. Changing Science and Technology and the Foundational Concepts Underlying Legal 
Rules 
The Belsito rule is facially clear and straightforward:  “[t]he test to identify the 
natural parents should be, ‘Who are the genetic parents?’”160  Unfortunately, as discussed 
supra in Part II.C.1, the test relies on a term, “genetic parents,” which has no clear 
definition, and where the most likely definition shows immediate flaws when faced with 
the new technology of human clones.  Without a clear and accurate definition of its 
underlying scientific terms, the Belsito test loses the very simplicity and specificity that 
led the court to choose it. 
An obvious but ultimately flawed answer to the challenge of faltering definitions 
arises:  why not just change the definitions to match the science?  This provides a 
particularly attractive solution if the potential change can clearly and simply answer the 
ambiguity—especially if the change in science can be viewed as a “one-off” change.  In 
the case of the pure genetics test, cloning might be the last step in reproductive 
technology, so that one change in definitions allows the rule to function properly.  In that 
case, the term “genetic parent” could reasonably be defined in at least two ways.  A 
genetic parent could be “an individual who contributes exactly one half of the genetic 
information contained in the nuclear161 DNA of the genetic child.”162 This definition 
                                                           
160 Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 761 (Ohio Ct. Pleas 1994). 
161 The inclusion of “nuclear” in the definition removes mitochondrial DNA as a potential 
source of genetic parentage, as discussed supra in notes 141-146, and accompanying text. 
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focuses on informational rather than physical inheritance (“blood” instead of “flesh”) and 
matches our intuition for Rob, the replacement child, but not Junior, child of the infertile 
couple.  A genetic parent could alternately be defined as “an individual who contributes 
nuclear DNA to the genetic child;” this definition reverses the emphasis from information 
to physical, and matches intuition on the infertile couple but not the replacement child.  It 
is hard to conceive of a definition that matches our intuition in both cases, but at least, the 
argument goes, a reworked definition can provide clarity underlying the pure genetics 
rule.   
Merely reworking underlying definitions inadequately addresses changing 
science.  Even if a definition is sufficiently nuanced to account for current technology 
and current intuitions, new technological developments will challenge the definition and 
require new nuances—some of which may be either unpalatable or actually impossible.  
The steady march of science and technology strongly suggests that redefinitions will 
rarely actually be “one-off.”  The definitions above for genetic parents may succeed in 
providing clarity for clones—even if they have flaws in terms of successfully matching 
intuition—but plausible scientific changes can again muddle the test under this definition.  
A near-term example comes in the field of prenatal gene therapy, where the fetal DNA 
encoding a defective protein is replaced by DNA which encodes the normal protein.163   
Under either of the definitions above, this would make the person from whom the 
functional DNA is taken a genetic parent.  Another innovation would confuse the 
definition even further:  more than two individuals may eventually be able to contribute 
substantial amounts of nuclear DNA to an embryo.164  Chromosomes have been movable 
by micromanipulation for many years;165 therefore, chromosomes from multiple 
individuals could theoretically be combined to create a complete set of nuclear DNA, 
which could then be inserted into an enucleated egg to create an embryo.  What 
reasonable definition of “genetic parent” could determine how a court, or any other 
entity, should assign parentage in such a case? 
Cloning and the other potential forms of reproduction just discussed are 
undoubtedly at the extreme of a technological continuum which moves from that end 
through IVF and surrogacy to unassisted conception through sexual intercourse.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                               
162 This definition might raise interesting and unexpected questions—for instance, does it 
cause problems for trisomy-21 (Downs syndrome) children, since one parent contributes two 
copies of chromosome 21, and therefore more than half of the child’s nuclear DNA?  The precise 
wording of an effective definition is itself challenging.  However, the challenges cloning and new 
reproductive science brings to creating definitions are of a different kind.  
163 Holm Schneider & Charles Coutelle, In Utero Gene Therapy: the Case For, 5  Natural 
Med. 256, 256-57 (1999). 
164 For a description of some possibilities for artificially combining genetic material in vitro in 
the context of homosexual couples, see D. Orentlicher, Beyond Cloning: Expanding Reproductive 
Options for Same-Sex Couples, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 651, 651 (2000). 
165 David A. Begg & Gordon W. Ellis, Micromanipulation Studies of Chromosome 
Movement: I. Chromosome-Spindle Attachment and the Mechanical Properties of Chromosomal 
Spindle Fibers, 82 J. Cell Biology 528, 528–51 (1979). 
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definitional problems they raise, however, point to issues within a greater swath of that 
continuum, often with much less straightforward analyses.   
Recent situations in Britain involving surrogacy and, in one instance, “regular” 
intercourse following a transplant exemplify other situations where the 
straightforwardness of genetic definitions is challenged.  In one instance, the wife of a 
sterile husband used a sperm donation from her husband’s father to initiate a 
pregnancy,166 leading to a genetic father who filled the social and legal role of 
grandfather, and a social and legal father who had half the usual genetic relationship with 
his child.167  In a complementary situation, a wife with a hysterectomy but viable eggs, 
like Crispina Calvert and Shelly Belsito, created an IVF embryo with her husband’s 
sperm, which was then carried to term by her mother;168 there, the genetic grandmother is 
the gestational mother, while the genetic mother and gestational sister takes on the legal 
and social role of mother.169  A third case raises similar complexities, but with traditional 
conception:  a woman received an ovarian transplant from her identical twin, then 
proceeded to conceive and bear a child.170  Physically the genetic material for the child 
came from the gestational mother’s sister, but informationally, the child’s genetic 
material is in fact identical to that of every cell in the gestational mother’s body;  here, as 
in cloning, “flesh” and “blood” lead to potentially conflicting conclusions.  Outside this 
particularly odd situation, ovarian and testicular transplants generally create situations 
where informational/genetic, biological/physical, and social parentage can be uncoupled, 
and where supposedly simple definitions based in genetics fail to successfully resolve 
complex issues.   
The examples above, drawn from the spheres of both potential scientific advances 
and real current situations, show the significant problems with forming legal rules that 
merely apply definitions supplied by rapidly changing science.  The Belsito court turned 
to scientific surety as a source of clarity, a modern codification of long-standing 
precedent.  The changes in that science, and the ways that those changes at the 
technological extremes point to issues in more mainstream areas of the technological 
                                                           
166 Man Donates Sperm for Grandchild, BBC, October 5, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7030267.stm. 
167 Geneticists typically describe the strength of genetic relationships (the coefficient of 
relationship, denoted R) as the fraction of shared genes; each traditional parent contributes half of 
their genome to their child, leading to an R of ½; grandparents have an R of ¼, siblings ½, and 
identical twins and clones have an R of 1. 
168 Twins for Surrogate Grandmother, BBC, January 30, 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/3441939.stm. 
169 This situation differs from other instances where a daughter donates oocytes to her mother, 
with the mother intending to bear and raise the child.  See, e.g., Lorna A. Marshall, 
Intergenerational Gamete Donation: Ethical and Societal Implications, 178 Am. J. Obstetrics & 
Gynecology 1171, 1171-76 (1998). 
170 Baby Born after Ovary Transplant, BBC, November 12, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7724212.stm. 
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continuum, show that such a turn to science yields results that are anything but clear.  
Rules based just on that science can have counterintuitive applications while maintaining 
clarity—or can become so muddied by complexity that they lose all usefulness and 
becomes a hindrance rather than a help.     
B. Changing Science and Technology as Elements of Judicial Balancing 
Changing science and technology cannot reveal invariable truths on which courts 
can rely to mechanically decide cases; they can, however, provide evidence germane to 
making a decision based on other factors as well.  Requiring some biological link for an 
assignment of natural parentage would help restrict the potential negative outcomes that 
could arise from the Johnson procreative-intent rule, for instance.  A compromise at the 
balancing stage might require parents to have some biological link to children (or at least 
a second-degree link through a spouse or partner), or else require state approval, similar 
to adoption proceedings.  Alternately, the Johnson approach could be adapted to require 
the explicit consent of the source of the genetic material (with the admitted complexities 
that blunt characterization raises).  Either of these approaches—or some combination of 
the two—would allow courts more leeway to determine what adequate biological links or 
sufficient consent means in the case at hand, taking into account the changing state of 
reproductive science, and still to weigh that against the social parameters that ultimately 
frame and shape the question of family relationships. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The larger issue here is the clash between biology/genetics as a primary 
determining factor of identity and the idea that families are defined by choice and intent.  
The conflict between these two spheres, once made effectively indistinguishable by the 
overwhelming prevalence of the traditional family, is reemphasized and enhanced by 
modern reproductive technologies.  More than any other immediately looming 
technology, the potential creation of human clones strips away many of the factors which 
obscure the issue in other contexts.  In clones, for the first time, genetics, gestation, and 
intention are both completely controlled and completely separable.   
The advent of human clones reveals something else in the way courts and lawyers 
think about family.  The rise of surrogacy—and the more recent rise of gestational 
surrogacy, where genetics can for the first time be made distinct from pregnancy—has 
led courts to consider the social institutions surrounding parentage, and to look for new 
ways to define the parent-child relationship when older concepts fail to deal with modern 
complexities.  Some courts have turned to further social definitions to resolve these 
issues, relying on procreative-intent, and choice as the determinant of the modern family.  
Others have turned to science, looking for truth and authority in a genetic conception of 
parentage—if science can provide a descriptive answer, then courts need not make a 
normative decision.  Ultimately, however, the construction of the family—especially the 
modern family—relies, and must rely, more on social choices than on scientific 
determinations.  This is especially clear when the science is changing, and answers that 
appear obvious one year may be just as obviously wrong the next.  Although science may 
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provide an intellectual bandage, it cannot provide the answers to what are ultimately hard 
social decisions.   
